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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between board of directors’ characteristics (educational level diversity, 
nationality diversity, board interlocking, board size and number of independent directors) and intellectual 
capital performance in a sample of 147 banks in Gulf Cooperation council (GCC) countries for the period 
2008-2010. The results show that IC performance of GCC listed banks is low. In contrast to our expectation, 
the number of independent directors has a significant negative relationship with IC performance of GCC 
listed banks. All other variables are not associated with IC performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of knowledge-based economy, intellectual capital (IC) rather than physical capital becomes 
the main factor in driving firm value and sustaining its competitive advantage. This is especially true for 
knowledge intensive industries such as the banking industry (Shih et al., 2010). Board of directors is viewed 
as an important tool to create, develop, leverage, and manage IC of a firm through structuring and formation 
of relevant strategies and policies. However, studies on  the  relationship between IC performance and board 
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Ho and Williams, 2003). Focusing on upper echelon theory and resource dependency theory, this study 
examines if board diversity (in terms of educational level and nationality) and board interlocking influence IC 
performance of GCC listed banks. Traditionally, measures of firm financial performance have been based on 
accounting and/or market values, in which they merely focus on physical capital in measuring firm 
performance. Thus, findings of this study expand the current understanding of the association between board 
diversity, board interlocking and firm performance defined within a new context, that is, IC. This study 
concentrates only on the banking industry, which is normally excluded by previous studies. The  reason  for  
selecting  GCC  banks  is because  the  socio-economic  structure  among the GCC  countries  is  quite  
similar,  which  enables  us to control the effect of their macro and cultural factors, leading to a more 
meaningful interpretation.. 
The structure of this study is as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature and hypotheses 
development. The third section presents the research method used. The fourth section discusses the findings 
of this study. The fifth section concludes the paper.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS EVELOPMENT 
 
2.1  Board diversity and IC performance 
 
The upper echelon theory argues that organizational outcomes such as firm performance, strategic orientation,  
innovation and creativity, and  diversification are influenced by top management diversity such as educational 
level, gender, and nationality (see e.g. Miller and Triane, 2009). The theory suggests that demographic 
diversity among board members provides a wider range of perspectives, and solutions that enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of board’s strategic decision-making. This will help them produce high quality 
innovative decisions that improve the quality of actions taken by a firm (see Wincent et al., 2010; Talke et al., 
2010). Hence, diversity in demographic attributes while affecting organizational outcomes should also affect a 
firm`s IC performance (Williams, 2000; Williams, 2001; Swartz and Firer, 2005). Resource dependency 
theorists argue that these advantages of diversity could help board bring or secure critical resources to a firm 
including IC (Abeysekera, 2010) which in turn lead to enhanced IC performance. 
Prior research has shown that educational level and nationality are positively associated with firm`s 
innovativeness and firm`s strategic choice in areas such as innovation, R&D, technology, and customer 
orientation (Miller and Triane, 2009; Talke et al., 2010) which in turn could improve firm`s IC performance. 
Nationality diversity among board members is viewed as an important mechanism to help a firm understand 
its culturally diverse employees and customers` base. This will enhance the board’s ability to instigate more 
comprehensive policies and strategies that improve its relationship with employees and customers. (Randoy et 
al., 2006; Williams, 2001). Firm reputation as one component of IC (Swartz and Firer, 2005) is found to be 
enhanced when board of directors is nationally diverse (Miller and Trian, 2009). Hence, based on the above 
discussion we hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1.  There is a positive relationship between board educational level diversity and bank IC 
performance.   
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive relationship between board nationality diversity and bank IC performance. 
   
2.2  Board interlocking and IC performance 
 
Board interlocking refers to the case in which directors sit on more than one board. From a resource 
dependency perspective, board interlocking is one mechanism in which a firm can access resources (ideas, 
information, capital) from external environment (e.g. Hillman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 1996). Shropshire 
(2010) stated that interlocking directors represent a communication channel to transfer knowledge and know-
how. This in turn facilitates IC development (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  According to Nahapiet and 
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Ghoshal (1998), the combination of knowledge and experience of different parties create and facilitate the 
development of IC. The positive association between board interlocking and innovation, firm reputation and 
legitimacy, and firm relationships with its important customers and suppliers could be observed, for example 
in the works of Wincent et al. (2010), Sarkar and Sarkar (2009), and Hillman et al. (2000).This in turn 
enhances IC performance. Hence, in line with the resource dependency theory, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between board interlocking and bank IC performance. 
 
2.3  Board size and IC performance 
 
According to resource dependency theory, larger boards are more likely to include increased pool of expertise 
who will enhance boards’ information processing capabilities. Board members will mitigate individual 
directors’ deficiencies in business skills through collective decision making which in turn improves the 
quality of firm strategic decisions and actions (Abeysekera, 2010; Ruigrok et al., 2006). Furthermore, larger 
boards are more likely to increase firms’ ability to obtain and secure critical resources from their environment 
such as IC resources (Abeysekera, 2010), assist in developing better interlocking relationships between the 
firm and its external stakeholder groups (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
Studies which investigate the relationship between board size and IC performance produce inconclusive 
results (Abidin et al., 2009; Ho and Williams, 2003). Based on the resource dependency theory and the 
foregoing arguments we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between board size and bank IC performance. 
 
2.4 Board independence and IC performance 
 
From resource dependency perspective, independent directors provide more resources, information, and 
legitimacy to a firm. They also improve the quality of managerial decisions leading to improved firm 
performance (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005; Hillman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 1996). It is argued that 
independent directors are more likely than inside directors to support managerial long-term oriented decisions 
that enhance firm long term performance (see e.g. Ibrahim, Howard and Angelidis, 2003). Hence, it is 
reasonable to expect that independent directors, through giving advice and counsel, are more likely to support 
IC-related strategies such as investing in human resources, R&D activities and information technology. 
Several studies documented the positive association between director independence and R&D activities and 
innovation (see.e.g. Chen and Hsu, 2009), firm`s legitimacy and linkages with its external environment, 
(Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005; Zahra and Pearce, 1989), and firm`s engagement in social responsibility 
programs (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Ibrahim et al., 2003). In line with resource dependency theory and 
based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between board independence and bank IC performance.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.1  Sample 
The sample frame comprises of all listed banks in GCC countries which encompass Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates during the period 2008-2010. The dataset consists of 74 
GCC listed banks. However, all Kuwaiti listed banks (11 banks) and several banks in other GCC countries are 
excluded from the sample due to missing relevant information. The final sample consists of 49 banks or 147 
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3.2  Measurement of variables 
 
3.2.1 IC performance 
We measure IC performance by using value added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) method developed by Pulic 
(1998). The instrument is widely used in studies of IC performance (see Abdulsalam et al., 2011; Ku Ismail 
and Abdul Karem, 2011; Goh, 2005; Ho and Williams, 2003).  This method is very important because it 
allows us to measure the contribution of both tangible (physical and financial) and intellectual (human and 
structural) resources to create value added (VA) by the firm. Algebraically, VAIC is expressed as follows:  
 
VAIC= CEE+HCE+SCE                         (1) 
 
Where: (i) CEE is an indicator of Value Added efficiency of capital employed (CEE=VA/CE); CE    = (book    
value    of    total    assets)    -    (intangible assets) = (financial assets) + (physical assets), (ii) HCE is an 
indicator of Value Added efficiency of human capital (HCE=VA/HC); HC = total salaries and wages, and (iii) 
SCE is an indicator of Value Added efficiency of structural capital (SCE=SC/VA), SC= VA –HC = (value 
added) - (total salaries & wages). IC efficiency (ICE) is the sum of human capital efficiency (HCE) and 
structural capital efficiency (SCE). Total VA is calculated by using information contained in the annual report 
as follows: 
 
VA = OP + EC + D +A                   (2)  
 
Where, OP = Operating Profits; EC = Total Employee Expenses; and D = Depreciation and A = Amortization. 
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
We use Blau’s index to measure board diversity (in terms of educational level and nationality). Board 
interlocking is measured as the total number of board seats that each board member holds in other firms and 
organizations (Wincent et al., 2010). Board size is the number of directors on the board. We measure board 
independence by the number of independent directors on the board. This measurement is similar to the study 
by Abeysekera (2010), which argues that the number of independent directors is better than using a 
percentage when the resource dependency theory is used.   
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
We control for other determinants of IC performance identified in the existing literature, that is bank size and 
financial performance, measured by the natural log of total assets  and return on equity (ROE), respectively.  
3.3 Statistical analyses 
The regression model utilized to test the relationship between the board characteristics and ICP is as follows:  
ICP = α + β1EDU + β2NAT+ β3BINLCK + β4BOSIZE + β5INDD + β6BASIZE + β7FINPRF + ε, 
where, EDU = diversity of educational level of directors; NAT = diversity of nationality of directors; 
BINLCK = board interlocking; BOSIZE = board size; INDD = board independence; BASIZE = bank size; 
FINPRF = financial performance; and ε = error term. 
4. FINDINGS 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the intellectual capital performance and the independent variables. 
The mean intellectual capital performance (ICP) for the banks throughout the study period is 4.04 which is 
consistent with figures reported by Al-Musalli and Ku Ismail (2011) in United Arab Emirates (4.4). The 
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average IC performance of the GCC listed banks in this study is low compared to the findings by El-Bannany 
(2008) for UK banks (10.80), Goh (2005) for Malaysian banks (7.11), but it is better compared to the findings 
by Joshi et al. (2010) in Australia (3.80). The table also shows that the average number of directors on the 
board in the GCC banks is 9 which is consistent with the figure reported by Chahine (2007) for GCC listed 
banks. The mean educational level diversity is 0.47. This indicates that the educational  
level diversity is moderate. The mean for nationality diversity is low with a score of 0.22. The statistics for 
board interlocking and number of independent directors indicate that GCC banks have on average 28 
interlocking directorates and about 5 independent directors. 
 
The results presented in Table 2 show that the regression model is significant (F=18.361, P<0.000) with an 
adjusted R square of .454. The table reveals that there  is  insufficient  evidence  to  infer  that  there  is  a  
linear  relationship  between  all measures of board diversity and IC performance of GCC banks.  
Table (1)  Descriptive statistics 
 
N Min Max Mean SD 
 ICP 147 -4.28 12.72 4.04 2.68 
EDU 147 .00 .69 .47 .17 
NAT 147 .00 .50 .24 .19 
BINLCK 147 2.00 74.00 27.71 14.89 
BOSIZE 147 3.00 13.00 9.06 2.00 
INDD 147 1.00 10.00 4.69 2.08 
BASIZE 147 7.36 10.89 9.81 .69 
FINPR 147 -.45 .36 .11 .13 
Table (2)  Regression results 









































Adjusted R square: 0.454; F-stat: 18.361; Sig.: 0.000 
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The possible reason of the insignificant effect of educational level diversity is that the work carried out on 
GCC bank boards does not require any specific educational level. Just as long as board members have a 
university  degree/or  equivalent  skills,  board members  have  sufficient  human  capital  in order  to  
understand IC-related information  that  is  provided  by  the  board  of  managing  directors. Human capital 
may be obtained from a career as directors in other firms or from a substantial experience in business life. We 
suggest two possible reasons to interpret the insignificant relationship between nationality and IC 
performance. First, it can be argued that the lack of any relationship between nationality diversity and IC 
performance may be due to the low number of foreigners on the boards of GCC banks. Another plausible 
reason is that the social psychological dynamics of locals may lead to a resistance toward foreign directors. 
Due to their common cultural and social ties, local directors may categorize themselves as the national group 
and foreign directors as foreigners group. In making decisions, local directors may favour the national group 
due to their commonality. Given the power of locals in the decision making and resource allocation processes 
of the firm, the effect of self-categorization by local directors is that the decisions of foreign directors will be 
given limited consideration or ignored completely.  
The insignificant effect of board interlocking on IC performance suggests that serving  on  boards  of multiple 
firms  makes  it  difficult  for  directors  to  gain  an  adequate  understanding  of  the  issues facing  any  one  
firm  and  so,  directors  with  multiple  appointments  have  no  way to influence IC related strategies. Board 
size does not influence IC performance. This finding is similar to the findings by Ho and Williams (2003), 
who conducted the study in South Africa, Sweden and the UK.   
Table 2 also shows the number of independent directors is significant at explaining IC performance, at the 
10% level.    However, the coefficient is negative, suggesting that there is significant negative relationship 
between number of independent directors and IC performance. This is contrary to the theoretical model and 
the stated hypothesis, which predicts a positive relationship between number of independent directors and IC 
performance. The negative relationship is may be because of the lack of a clear definition of independent 
director in the various corporate governance codes and guidelines issued by regulatory authorities in the GCC 
region (Mujtaba and William, 2011) that might prevent banks from appointing ‘truly’ independent directors. 
Another reason is that boards need specialized, expert-provided information about firms’ activities to evaluate 
and ratify the firm's long-term strategies such as IC related strategies. But, the attainment of this knowledge 
requires both time and firm-specific expertise on the part of the director, two things that inside directors have 
but independent directors lack (Klein 1998). The  regression  results also  show  that  the relationship  
between  the  control  variables  and IC performance, as expected are  positive and  significant  at  the  1%  
level for financial performance and 10% for bank size..   
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study provides evidence that the number of independent directors on the board has a negative impact on 
bank`s IC performance. The  results  imply  that  the  request for a minimum  number  (one-third of the board) 
of  independent directors on the board by the corporate governance codes in GCC countries may not be to the 
banks' advantage and that banks may need to reevaluate their nominating procedures and board composition 
with respect to  selecting  future board members. The results further imply that a GCC bank with a larger 
board size, larger board interlocking, larger diversity will have no advantage over their smaller counterparts in 
context of IC performance. The insignificant impact of these four characteristics on GCC banks` performance  
may  be  interpreted  by  the  absence of a real application for the appropriate principles and standards of  
corporate   governance  to  listed  banks in GCC countries. 
The findings seems to support the theoretical assumption by scholars like Talke et al., (2010) and Certo et al. 
(2006) that board diversity exhibits no main effect on firm performance suggesting that instead of 
investigating a simple direct relationship between board diversity and firm performance, variables that affect 
this relationship should be explored.  
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